2 New Appeals: Habeas Corpus in a Ward of Court procedure, and that procedure’s conflict with rights under the Constitution and ECHR

In this determination, AC & Anor v Cork University Hospital & Ors, the Supreme Court granted the Health Service Executive (HSE) leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision that it acted unlawfully in refusing to release Mrs C even though the hospital staff were concerned for her welfare and believed that she did not have the mental capacity to make the decision to leave.

In this second determination, AC v Fitzpatrick, Director of Nursing at St. Finbarr’s Nursing Home & Ors, the Supreme Court granted PC leave for a leapfrog appeal challenging High Court orders making his mother, Mrs C, a ward of court. Leave is granted on the narrow grounds that the wardship procedure in the High Court, which has its statutory grounding in the Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871 and s 9 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, is incompatible with rights guaranteed under the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights.

 

Background

In June 2016, Mrs C was 93 years of age and suffering from dementia. Her son, PC, and daughter sought to have her released into their care from Cork University Hospital (CUH). CUH refused to release Mrs C as medical staff had concerns for her welfare and believed she did not have the mental capacity to make a decision concerning her own release.

PC issued High Court proceedings under Article 40 of the Constitution (habeas corpus) seeking an order that CUH release Mrs C onto his care. Kelly P refused to grant that order. He found that Mrs C was not in unlawful detention, as two consultants had given evidence that they had concerns for her wellbeing and her capacity to make the decision on her own release.

PC appealed that decision to the Court of Appeal. In the intervening time, the High Court, Kelly P, granted the HSE an order making Mrs C a ward of court, placing her in the care of St Finbarr’s Nursing Home. Kelly P also ordered that Mrs C’s release from the HSE’s care could only be pursued through the ward of court procedure—not through an Article 40 application.

The CoA (here) made a declaration that “at the time of the original application in the High Court, [there was] no lawful basis for Mrs C’s continued detention and also held that she was entitled to maintain the proceedings notwithstanding that she had been admitted to wardship” [Det 4]. The CoA made no orders.

The HSE applied to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal that decision. The Court granted leave on grounds that the case raised matters of general public importance that could arise on other occasions. That is the subject of the first determination, above.

Following the CoA decision, PC sought to have Mrs C released from St Finbarr’s into his care. St Finbarr’s refused on grounds that Mrs C was a ward of court in their care. PC brought another Article 40 application to the High Court. A number of judges refused to hear that application. The CoA held that those judges were in error in refusing to hear PC’s application. PC returned to the High Court. Faherty J heard his application but rejected it on grounds that Mrs C is a ward of court and is not in unlawful detention.

PC sought leave for a leapfrog appeal to the Supreme Court. That is the subject of the second determination, above. Given Mrs C’s age and the urgency of the case, the Court made a discretiorary exception to the rule that an Article 40 application is not an appropriate vehicle for correcting past unlawful detentions: it is an exceptional remedy in urgent cases. The Court granted PC leave on the narrow grounds outlined above.

New Appeal: Is the grant of citizenship within the unfettered discretion of the Minister for Justice and Equality?

In this determination, AP v Minister for Justice and Equality, the Supreme Court granted AP, a refugee from the Islamic Republic or Iran, leave to appeal against the Minister’s refusal to approve his application for citizenship on grounds of national security. The Court certified four questions, subject to refinement during case management:

Whether the grant of citizenship is within the unfettered discretion of the Minister for Justice and Equality and, if so, whether any procedures inure to the benefit of an applicant?

Whether national security issues need to be disclosed to an applicant for citizenship in such a way as to enable that applicant to meet, or at least make any relevant representations that may be thought appropriate, those concerns prior to any decision against a grant of citizenship is made?

Whether fairness of procedures demands that a decision internal to the Department of Justice and equality to refuse citizenship be reviewed externally and by what mechanism?

Whether the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms governs the application for and refusal of citizenship by the Minister for Justice and Equality?

New Appeal: Is CCTV footage “available evidence” that can be put directly to a jury?

In this determination, Director of Public Prosecutions v Gruchacz, the Supreme Court granted Gruchacz leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal. Gruchacz is seeking clarification on: 1) whether CCTV footage is “available evidence” which can be put directly to a jury; and 2) whether s 16 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 permits a court to treat a witness as hostile where that witness stands over most of their previous statement.

 

Background

In April, 2016 a jury convicted Gruchacz of murder. At trial, the trial judge determined that CCTV footage of a person that the DPP asserted was Gruchacz was “available evidence” which could be put directly to the jury to decide for themselves whether it was Gruchacz in the images. Gruchacz claims that this was a departure from the decision of Barron J in DPP v Maguire [1995] 2 IR 286 regarding what is available evidence which can be put to a jury. Gruchacz argues that this prohibited him from challenging the evidence; that the CCTV footage should have been put to a witness known to him so that he could challenge their opinion on whether the images were of him.

Also, the trial judge permitted that a witness was characterised as hostile, where the witness stood over most of his previous statement but resiled from his identification of Gruchacz. Gruchacz argues that the law regarding s 16 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 is unclear.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Gruchacz’s appeal.

Granting leave for a further appeal, the Supreme Court determined that the case raises questions of law of general public importance which can arise in many trials.

Ireland as a Common Law Port after Brexit: A paper by the Chief Justice

The Chief Justice of Ireland, Mr Justice Frank Clarke, has written a paper titled Ireland as a Common Law Port after Brexit for delivery to a seminar at Fordham University in New York.

The Courts Services provided copies of the paper, which I have uploaded here: Ireland as a Common Law Port after Brexit; and an accompanying paper here: Potential impact of Brexit on selected aspects of private international law.

 

The Courts Services sent out the following press release:

The Chief Justice of Ireland, Mr Justice Frank Clarke, has said that the issue of Brexit is of singular importance to Ireland, to the European Union, to the United Kingdom and, indeed, to countries such as the United States which have close relations with all of us. He said the problems which will arise from Brexit span so many areas. In particular the consequences for Ireland of the possible re-emergence of a hard border between North and South is potentially a critical issue.

Speaking to a seminar in Fordham University in New York, the aspect of Brexit he concentrated on was its impact both on the European legal order and on legal issues involving other friendly countries, in particular the United States, which have regular dealings with Europe.

He said that in many areas EU law has become entwined with the national legal order of member states and it is that very fact which makes the disentanglement required by Brexit all the more problematic.

Possible Central role for Ireland in International Litigation

Ireland will almost certainly have to play a leading role, post Brexit, as the main common law jurisdiction remaining within the European Union. On the other hand, that very fact provides opportunities for the Irish legal system, including its courts and arbitral tribunals, he said, to act in a significantly expanded way as a location for dispute resolution in international litigation, including insolvency, where both the common law and recognition throughout the European Union are of importance.

The Chief Justice pointed out that Brexit critical dates begin in six months, and that commercial and business contracts being negotiated and finalised now could well be adjudicated under different, post Brexit arrangements.

The uncertainty which pervades the type of legal order which will then prevail has a very real potential, therefore, to affect the outcome of arrangements entered into today. The uncertainty to which that gives rise and the challenges and opportunities which follow are the particular focus of the issues he addressed.

Ireland will be largest Common Law Country in EU

He said that post Brexit, Ireland will be by far the largest common law country in the EU and will, in substance, be the only country whose legal system could reasonably be described as being fully in the common law tradition with both Cyprus and Malta having, to a greater or lesser extent, a mixed system.

· In the past, the smaller EU common law countries have placed significant reliance on the UK both to do the research necessary to identify potential problems for the transposition of proposed EU legislative measures into a common law jurisdiction and also to make the case to the European institutions for solutions.

· Increasingly Ireland is being asked to nominate senior judges to many EU legal bodies.

· Likewise, the Chief Justice pointed out that the Irish Attorney General has acknowledged that it may be necessary for Ireland to intervene in many more cases before the European Court of Justice where there is a particular common law interest in the issues at stake.

Uncertainty and Difficulties Over Future Legal Arrangements with the UK

Throughout the EU, in very many cases, there is a single streamlined basis both for determining which member state has jurisdiction to deal with a particular legal issue and the obligation of all other member states to recognise and give full effect to the result of litigation which is conducted in the member state having jurisdiction.

The Chief Justice said that “We just do not know what arrangements, if any, will be negotiated between the EU and the UK to replace the fact that the UK is today a fully integrated member of that legal order based on mutual trust and recognition”.

He said that “there are potential difficulties with at least most of the potential solutions and there remains the undoubted political difficulty which stems from the understandable desire of the European Union to ensure that the UK cannot just cherry-pick those aspects of its relations with the EU which it wishes to retain and extract itself from those obligations with which it is not happy……….. if it were to be seen to be the case that a member state could leave the European Union and keep the bits that suited it and discard the bits that did not then that driver of cohesion would be lost”.

“There remains very significant doubt about the precise nature of the arrangements which are likely to be entered into not least because of the political red line identified by the UK Government which suggests that the UK is unwilling to accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in any future arrangements. While it is not impossible to envisage arrangements which get around that difficulty it does remain a significant barrier. Thus the legal regime which will come about either in March 2019 after the expiry of the Article 50 notice or in January 2021 when the possible transition period will come to an end, is very hard to predict.”

At one extreme there is the so-called “No Deal” Brexit whose consequences are explored in the paper. This would give rise to very great difficulties in relation to legal issues involving the UK and any other member state of the EU and, indeed, any such issues involving also third parties such as US Corporations.

Opportunities : Irish ‘Examinership’ Model Closer to that of US

The UK has established a very substantial place in the market for international insolvency litigation utilising its corporate recovery models of administration and schemes of arrangement. But a great deal of what led to the success of the UK in establishing itself as a major centre for insolvency stemmed from the fact that, under the Insolvency Regulation, orders made by UK courts carried throughout the European Union. It seems unlikely that will remain to be the case post Brexit. ….. the playing pitch will change with Brexit in that it may well be that the orders of UK courts will not have cross European recognition while the orders of the Irish courts will.

Ireland has, in its examinership corporate recovery model, a system which is perhaps closer to Chapter 11 (US model) than the UK system of administration. Like Chapter 11 the company in examinership remains under the control of its existing management during an examinership but, unlike Chapter 11, the scheme for recovery is prepared by a fiduciary rather than by the company itself.

Chief Justice Clarke, “I think I can safely say that the Irish examinership model would provide at least as an effective means of dealing with cross European insolvency as the UK administration system has to date”.

Jurisdiction is based on the concept of determining the centre of main interests (or COMI) of the corporation concerned but any experienced insolvency practitioner will tell you that, with a little time and a little effort, it is often possible to establish COMI in a jurisdiction of choice.

It seems to me to follow that Brexit also affords significant opportunities for Ireland in the legal sphere. This is particularly so in the context of transactions or litigation which involve common law countries who wish to do business within the EU in a legal system with which they are familiar but where European rules including, in particular, rules which give Europe wide recognition, apply.

Ireland’s ability to cater for increased work

It has been suggested, by some potential competitors for a slice of the UK market, that Ireland has a limited capacity to take on the sort of additional high level international litigation which might arise. While there is an obvious limit to the capacity of any jurisdiction, I could not agree that the Irish courts, and Irish litigators, would be found wanting if called on to take on significant additional international work.

There is little doubt but that Ireland will have competitors but in my view we, in the Irish legal system, are very well placed. Ireland will remain a common law country. The ordinary language of the Irish courts will continue to be English. But importantly Ireland will remain a member of the European Union and the decisions of Irish courts will continue to be easily enforceable throughout the European Union. Those are advantages which we have and which are not shared by any other jurisdiction.

Ireland can provide, not least for those outside the EU in the common law world, a safe haven. In a time of great uncertainty I would like to think that safe haven may prove to be a significant advantage.

New Appeal: Where a jury convict for manslaughter over murder, how does the judge determine what facts have been decided?

In this determination, Director of Public Prosecutions v Mahon, the Supreme Court granted Mahon leave to appeal against the severity of his sentence for manslaughter on the questions:

Where a jury acquit a person accused of murder but convict that person of manslaughter, what facts are before the trial judge in sentencing for that crime and is there any further form of enquiry necessitated in order to find such facts and, if so, by what procedure?

How does a trial judge approach setting a proper sentence which is valid in the context of the gravity of the crime of manslaughter, widely variable as such sentence is primarily based on the individual facts of the crime, but perhaps aggravated or mitigated by other factors?

Was the approach of the trial judge in this case as to the facts before the court on the jury acquittal for murder but conviction for manslaughter correct and was the sentence appropriate?

 

Background

Mahon killed the son of his ex-partner with a large kitchen knife. He left the scene without seeking medical assistance for the victim. There were no witnesses to the crime. The DPP sought a murder conviction, introducing evidence of animosity between Mahon and the victim and evidence that Mahon had earlier threatened to stab his ex-partner.

The jury acquitted Mahon of murder but convicted him of manslaughter. In her sentencing remarks, Hedigan J recited the facts of the case influencing her decision. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mahon’s appeal.

Granting leave for a further appeal, the Court found that Mahon had raised a question of general public importance and set out his argument as:

Mahon argues that the acceptance by the Court of Appeal of the correctness of the sentence imposed by Heneghan J involves an affirmation of her taking a view of the facts in circumstances where she ought to have resolved any unclear facts on the basis of taking a view of the facts most favourable to the accused. Criticism is levelled at the judgment of the Court of Appeal in deciding that where “several different scenarios have been canvassed to a greater or lesser extent … the sentencing judge [may] form an overview of the case and sentence accordingly” [10].

New Appeal: Can the deposit of deeds still create an equitable mortgage?

In this determination, Ulster Bank Limited v Hannon, the Supreme Court granted Hannon leave to appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeal on the question:

Has the Registration of Deeds and Title Act 2006, and in particular s 73 thereof, abolished equitable mortgages by deposit of land certificates or other title deeds with a view to securing borrowings and what is the effect of that legislation in terms of the ranking of priorities where several charges are created over land including by the deposit of land certificates or title deeds?

 

Background

Hannon deposited deeds for land with Ulster Bank as security for loans. In 2014 the High Court made an order that by virtue of the deposit of those deeds the money owed to the Bank stood well charged against Hannon’s land.

In the Court of Appeal, Hannon argued that, with the coming into force of s 73 of the Registration of Deeds and Title Act 2006, depositing of deeds for land no longer has the effect of creating an equitable mortgage. The Bank argued that the effect of s 73 is that the deed holder no longer has priority over persons with a registered charge on the land. The CoA upheld the High Court order.

Hannon sought leave of the Supreme Court for a further appeal. Granting leave, the Court held that the case raised an issue of general public importance in light of the number of informal mortgages created by the deposit of deeds and the requirement by the 2006 Act that lenders register any lien created in that manner.

New Appeal: Does the payment of excessive fees to expert witnesses raise a perception of bias?

In this determination, O’Leary v Mercy University Hospital Cork Limited & Anor, the Supreme Court granted O’Leary leave to appeal on the question of whether the payment of large fees to expert witnesses created a conflict of interest and a perception of bias.

 

Background

O’Leary was unsuccessful in plenary proceedings for medical negligence and a claim not to have given informed consent to the procedure undertaken against the defendants (MUHC). The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision. In the process of taxation of costs it came to O’Leary’s attention that MUHC had paid €27,230 to one medical expert witness and €19,870 to another.

O’Leary sought leave of the Supreme Court to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal on the issues of negligence and informed consent. But O’Leary raised a third issue, alleging that the fees paid by MUHC to the two expert witnesses created a conflict of interest and thereby breached the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 40.3 of the Constitution and Article 6.1 and 13 of the ECHR.

The Court determined that O’Leary had not reached the constitutional threshold for an appeal on the issues of negligence and consent but had reached that threshold on the issue of conflict of interest and a perception of bias.

The Court stated, however, that the question may arise during case management as to whether plenary proceedings before the High Court is a more appropriate means for the case to proceed.

Chief Justice calls for clearer legislation on environmental considerations in planning

The Courts Services released the following statement:

Today at the launch of the Planning, Environmental and Local Government Bar Association, the Chief Justice the Hon Mr Justice Frank Clarke made a call for both our national and European legislators to enact clearer legislation in the environmental area, to avoid drawn out processes of litigation and major projects faltering as a result.

Chief Justice Frank Clarke said that without clearer legislation:

There will continue to be projects which, even though they may successfully clear all hurdles at the end of the day, may suffer by being held up for too long.

The Minister for Housing , the AG, and Dr Aine Ryall of UCC were also due to speak at the launch.

 

Conclusion of Chief Justice’s Speech:

“I acknowledge that we in the courts need to play our part in ensuring that our systems are as good as they can be so as to lead to timely disposition of environmental litigation. But as long as legislators both in Europe and in Leinster House produce unclear or unduly complex legislation there will undoubtedly be arguments which will go beyond the unstateable or the trivial and which will take a lot of effort to resolve. As long as that remains the case then projects are going to be held up. The solution lies at least as much in the hands of legislators in producing greater clarity as it does in the courts and, from my perspective, lies even more on the legislative side. This is a cry which is not based on a complaint that the policy behind any particular piece of legislation is wrong. That is not a judge’s business. It is a cry for clearer legislation which will make the resolution of environmental litigation easier and therefore quicker. And a final point. If we keep amending legislation, as we have been doing a lot in recent times, then we create constant and shifting uncertainty. It is almost inevitable that there will be some issues of interpretation with any new model. If we keep changing the model than we perpetuate the period during which the interpretation of the existing model has not settled down.

If there is a political demand for greater speed in the resolution of environmental cases then a significant part of the solution lies in the production of clear and well worked out legislation both at the European and National level. If that does not happen then there will continue to be cases which will not be clear cut and which, under the CILFIT jurisprudence of the CJEU, may have to be referred to the European Court and there will continue to be projects which, even though they may successfully clear all hurdles at the end of the day, may suffer by being held up for too long. The solution to that problem is not just one to be found within the planning decision makers or the Courts but, to quite a significant extent, in legislators”.

Chief Justice’s Full Speech.

New Appeal: What are an employer’s obligations under s 16 of the Employment Equality Act 1998?

In Nano Nagle School v Daly, the Supreme Court granted Daly leave to appeal on the correct interpretation of s 16 of the Employment Equality Act 1998, which implemented the provisions of Council Directive 2000/78/EC.

 

Background

Daly was a special needs assistant (SNA) in the School, which provides for the needs of children with profound disabilities. In 2010 she suffered injuries which led to her confinement to a wheelchair. In 2011 she sought to return to work. An occupational therapist determined that there are 16 main duties required of an SNA, that Daly would be unable to perform seven of those, but that she would be able to perform nine of those duties with some adaptations to the facilities.

 

The relevant sections of the 1998 Act are outlined in the determination:

Under s.16(3)(b) an employer is under an obligation to take appropriate measures where needed in particular case to enable a person who has a disability to participate in employment unless the measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer. However s.16(1) provides that nothing in the Act is to be construed as “requiring any person to……. retain an individual in the position….. if the individual is not (or as the case may be is no longer) fully competent and available to undertake and fully capable of undertaking the duties attached to that position having regard to the conditions under which those duties are, or may be required to be performed”. The next step is that under s.16(3)(a) a person with a disability is fully competent and capable of undertaking any duties is appropriate measures may be provided by the person’s employer. Finally , for these purposes s 16(4) (a) provides that “appropriate measures” in relation to a person with a disability means effective and practical measures to adapt a place of business to the disability concerned which under s16(4) (b) may include “distribution of tasks”.

 

The School concluded that Daly was unfit to return to work. Daly made a complaint to the Equality Tribunal. The Equality Officer decided that there was no discrimination. The Labour Court overturned that decision on grounds that the school failed to give adequate consideration to all the possible options, such as redistributing the tasks Daly was unable to perform among other SNAs. The High Court held that there was no error in law in that decision. However the Court of Appeal allowed the School’s appeal on grounds that, as the School was not required to redistribute tasks it could not have been obliged to consider that option. Daly applied to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal.

 

Supreme Court

The Court determined that given that there were such divergence in the interpretation of an important provision which derived from a directive of EU law, the case met the constitutional threshold for leave to appeal on whether the Court of Appeal erred in its interpretation of s 16 of the 1998 Act.

New Appeal: Is the defence of officially induced error (or entrapment by estoppel) available in this jurisdiction?

In this determination, Director of Public Prosecutions v Casey, the Supreme Court granted Casey, former chief executive of Irish Life and Permanent, leave to appeal on whether the trial judge should have allowed him to raise the defence of officially induced error at his trial for conspiring to mislead investors (Anglo Irish case). The Court granted leave on the questions:

whether the defence of “officially induced error” is available in this jurisdiction and, if so, what its parameters are and whether it was open to the applicant on the evidence in this case.

 

Background

The Dublin Circuit Criminal Court found Casey (and others) guilty of a single count of conspiring to mislead investors by circulating funds between Irish Life Assurance and Anglo-Irish Bank for the purpose of inflating Anglo’s deposit balance by €7.2 billion. At trial, Casey sought to introduce a defence of officially induced error, which is known in the US as entrapment by estoppel. It was his case that the financial regulator, the Central Bank and the Department of Finance knew of and approved of the scheme.

The trial judge refused to allow Casey raise that defence, finding that the evidence presented could only go towards mitigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Casey’s appeal, setting out the test for a defence of officially induced error as:

(i) The accused must have considered the legal consequences of their actions and sought legal advice;

(ii) The legal advice must have been obtained from appropriate government officials who were involved in the administration of the law in question;

(iii) The legal advice must have been erroneous;

(iv) The legal advice must have been relied upon;

(v) The reliance must have been objectively reasonable.

Casey sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. He argued that the authorities from the US and Canada did not support the CoA’s finding that it was necessary that an accused show that they had obtained legal advice on the illegal act.

The Supreme Court determined that Casey had raised an issue of general public importance and granted leave to appeal.