All posts in category Habeas Corpus

2 New Appeals: Habeas Corpus in a Ward of Court procedure, and that procedure’s conflict with rights under the Constitution and ECHR

In this determination, AC & Anor v Cork University Hospital & Ors, the Supreme Court granted the Health Service Executive (HSE) leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision that it acted unlawfully in refusing to release Mrs C even though the hospital staff were concerned for her welfare and believed that she did not have the mental capacity to make the decision to leave.

In this second determination, AC v Fitzpatrick, Director of Nursing at St. Finbarr’s Nursing Home & Ors, the Supreme Court granted PC leave for a leapfrog appeal challenging High Court orders making his mother, Mrs C, a ward of court. Leave is granted on the narrow grounds that the wardship procedure in the High Court, which has its statutory grounding in the Lunacy Regulation (Ireland) Act 1871 and s 9 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, is incompatible with rights guaranteed under the Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights.

 

Background

In June 2016, Mrs C was 93 years of age and suffering from dementia. Her son, PC, and daughter sought to have her released into their care from Cork University Hospital (CUH). CUH refused to release Mrs C as medical staff had concerns for her welfare and believed she did not have the mental capacity to make a decision concerning her own release.

PC issued High Court proceedings under Article 40 of the Constitution (habeas corpus) seeking an order that CUH release Mrs C onto his care. Kelly P refused to grant that order. He found that Mrs C was not in unlawful detention, as two consultants had given evidence that they had concerns for her wellbeing and her capacity to make the decision on her own release.

PC appealed that decision to the Court of Appeal. In the intervening time, the High Court, Kelly P, granted the HSE an order making Mrs C a ward of court, placing her in the care of St Finbarr’s Nursing Home. Kelly P also ordered that Mrs C’s release from the HSE’s care could only be pursued through the ward of court procedure—not through an Article 40 application.

The CoA (here) made a declaration that “at the time of the original application in the High Court, [there was] no lawful basis for Mrs C’s continued detention and also held that she was entitled to maintain the proceedings notwithstanding that she had been admitted to wardship” [Det 4]. The CoA made no orders.

The HSE applied to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal that decision. The Court granted leave on grounds that the case raised matters of general public importance that could arise on other occasions. That is the subject of the first determination, above.

Following the CoA decision, PC sought to have Mrs C released from St Finbarr’s into his care. St Finbarr’s refused on grounds that Mrs C was a ward of court in their care. PC brought another Article 40 application to the High Court. A number of judges refused to hear that application. The CoA held that those judges were in error in refusing to hear PC’s application. PC returned to the High Court. Faherty J heard his application but rejected it on grounds that Mrs C is a ward of court and is not in unlawful detention.

PC sought leave for a leapfrog appeal to the Supreme Court. That is the subject of the second determination, above. Given Mrs C’s age and the urgency of the case, the Court made a discretiorary exception to the rule that an Article 40 application is not an appropriate vehicle for correcting past unlawful detentions: it is an exceptional remedy in urgent cases. The Court granted PC leave on the narrow grounds outlined above.

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by scoirlblog on October 9, 2018  •  Permalink
Posted in Constitution, Habeas Corpus, New Appeals

Posted by scoirlblog on October 9, 2018

https://scoirl.wordpress.com/2018/10/09/2-new-appeals-habeas-corpus-in-a-ward-of-court-procedure-and-that-procedures-conflict-with-rights-under-the-constitution-and-echr/

POI v Governor of Cloverhill Prison: Not necessary that detention order be headed “Warrant”

Here, POI v Governor of Cloverhill Prison, the Supreme Court held that:

1. It is not necessary for the document directing the detention of an individual pending deportation to have the word “Warrant” in its heading in order to be valid.

2. A certificate provided in an Article 40.4 enquiry may be amended, as can a warrant where there is an underlying valid basis such as a court order which would justify the detention of an individual. Where there is no other underlying valid basis for the detention other than the document relied on, as in this case, amendments should be confined to trivial errors or mistakes which could not cause any confusion as to the basis for the detention of the individual concerned. The warrant or other document justifying a detention cannot be corrected or amended if the ambiguity on its face reflects a more deep-seated confusion in the proceedings, such as where the true state of affairs is not reliably ascertainable from any source.

3. Consideration should be given to the possibility of a short stay or injunction to restrain deportation to enable the making of an application for leave to appeal to this court, where appropriate, on strict terms to ensure that any such application takes place within an appropriate time frame to facilitate all concerned.

 

Background

The Governor of Cloverhill Prison was holding P pending deportation on a valid, unchallenged order for deportation. P issued Article 40.4.2° (habeas corpus) proceedings in the High Court. He alleged that the order for his detention was invalid, as it was headed “Notification of arrest and detention” instead of “Warrant of arrest and detention”. The High Court (Humphreys J) held that the warrant was defective but that the court had an inherent jurisdiction to permit the amendment of the document. The Governor amended the document heading to “Warrant of arrest and detention”, and Humphreys J held that P’s detention was legal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed P’s appeal and upheld the Governor’s cross appeal. It held that the original document was sufficient to justify P’s detention. It also upheld the High Court’s finding on its inherent jurisdiction to amend.

The Supreme Court determined that P had raised issues of general public importance which met the constitutional threshold for a further appeal to the Supreme Court and certified a number of questions:

1. Must the document required to justify the detention of an individual be headed as a “Warrant of Detention” in order to be valid ?

2. What is the nature of the power to amend a document providing for the detention of an individual relied on in answer to an enquiry under Article 40.4.2° of the Constitution and can a new warrant be provided in place of the original document relied on to justify the detention?

3. Can such new document be backdated to the date of the original detention of the individual or should it be regarded as being in addition to the original documentation provided by way of certificate rather than a substitution thereof?

4. What effect, if any, does backdating have on the validity of the documentation relied on and the steps taken to detain the applicant?

5. Finally, what is the jurisdiction of any Court to grant a stay or an injunction to restrain the deportation of an individual pending appeal when the underlying deportation order has never been challenged?

Dunne J wrote the judgment for a unanimous five judge panel.

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by scoirlblog on December 27, 2017  •  Permalink
Posted in Constitution, Habeas Corpus

Posted by scoirlblog on December 27, 2017

https://scoirl.wordpress.com/2017/12/27/poi-v-governor-of-cloverhill-prison-not-necessary-that-detention-order-be-headed-warrant/

CFA v McG: Habeas corpus can be an appropriate remedy in childcare proceedings where there has been a fundamental breach of justice

shutterstock-2918689-630x420Here, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s judgment granting McG a writ of habeas corpus against the District Court’s order placing her children in the CFA’s care. The Court held that an application under Article 40.4.2° of the Constitution (habeas corpus) was appropriate as the District Court had breached McG’s constitutional right to fair procedure in the custody hearing.

Background

This case began in the District Court, where the Child and Family Agency (CFA) was seeking an interim care order for two children. The children’s mother (McG) and father (JC) both suffered from drug addiction. Their relationship was chaotic and often violent. And McG and the children (14 and 5) had no settled home. But the children were in no immediate danger. Legal aid was provided to McG on the morning of the hearing. The solicitor provided only had a few minutes to meet the mother and did not have time to review the social worker reports on which the application was based. JC was awaiting legal aid. The parties agreed to seek a one week adjournment to allow the legal aid solicitors to prepare. However, the judge had read the CFA’s submission and refused the application for an adjournment. She made an order transferring custody of the children to the CFA.

McG brought a High Court habeas corpus application under Article 40.4.2º of the Constitution seeking an order that her children were unlawfully detained.

In the High Court, Baker J (here) ordered the release of the children, stating:

50. I am satisfied that the order was not lawfully made and was made without affording an opportunity to the applicants to fully engage with the evidence. Because the question before the District Court related to the day-to-day relationship and care of the children by their mother, and the ongoing contact between the children and their mother, the frailty in the making of the order impacts on its validity in a way that failed to engage the welfare of the children and their place in a family unit.

The CFA applied to the Supreme Court for a leapfrog appeal, bypassing the Court of Appeal. Granting leave to appeal, the Court determined that the CFA had met the applicable constitutional threshold. The Court certified one question:

Where children are made subject to an interim care order under section 17 of the Child Care Act 1991 requiring “that the child named in the order be placed or maintained in the care of” the applicant Child and Family Agency, are such children ever subject to a habeas corpus remedy under Article 40.4.2º of the Constitution as being “unlawfully detained”?

Supreme Court

MacMenamin J wrote the judgment for the majority of the seven judge Court; only Charleton J dissented—and only in part.

The CFA argued, among other things, that habeas corpus proceedings are ill-suited to childcare issues and transfer of custody is not detention. Such proceedings are limited to orders for detention issued without jurisdiction, and McG should have appealed the decision on merits.

MacMenamin dismissed those arguments. Firstly, there is long held Supreme Court authority permitting the use of Article 40 proceedings in child custody proceedings, most recently in N v HSE [2006] IESC 60. Secondly, the order was comparable to detention, as the children were placed under the complete control and supervision of the CFA and were not free to leave. And thirdly, this is a case where the order was issued in breach of a fundamental breach of fair procedure and was therefore without jurisdiction.

MacMenamin J stated in conclusion:

  1. In the instant case, the practical vindication of the rights of parents warranted an appropriate, proper and effective level of legal representation in the District Court proceedings permitting real engagement therein. The situation which arose in this case, although undoubtedly motivated by proper intentions, unfortunately amounted to a denial of the constitutional rights of the parents. As a matter of fair procedures, both respondents had the right to meaningfully engage in the proceedings. This necessitated effective legal representation for both parents. In the absence of such fair procedures and natural justice, the hearing was not in accordance with law.
  1. In holding that Article 40 is appropriate, in these exceptional circumstances, where there has been a denial of constitutional justice, I would not wish to be taken as, in any way, derogating from the clear observations of this Court made in Ryan or Roche (Dumbrell). I would hold that a constitutional application of s.23 requires that the orders of the Court be effected in a constitutionally compliant sequence, vindicating, where so required, in the first instance, the right to liberty by an order for release, and second, if necessary, by an ancillary order under s.23 of the Act, protecting the welfare of children. I would entirely deprecate the usage of Article 40 proceedings in routine inter-parental care disputes. Moreover, the duty of the court hearing such an application is always to have the welfare of children as the paramount consideration.

O’Donnell J issued a concurring judgment (here).

Charleton J dissented (here). He believed that the parents had not established that the District Court issued the order without jurisdiction, stating:

  1. Finally, and concurring with the majority, habeas corpus applications in child care and custody cases are not to be encouraged. In the event that matters are not ready to proceed and in the event that the applicant consents to an adjournment but the District Court having read all the papers considers that the children are in danger, then evidence can be called which may justify the making of an emergency care order on an application by the Child and Family Agency. It was the failure to prove that these children were not in such danger when the District Court made its determination that required this dissent, which is essentially one as to the failure of the mother and father to prove that the judge dealing with the case of these children at first instance was so much in error as to be a failure of jurisdiction.
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by scoirlblog on February 25, 2017  •  Permalink
Posted in Constitution, Fair procedure, Family, Habeas Corpus, Uncategorized

Posted by scoirlblog on February 25, 2017

https://scoirl.wordpress.com/2017/02/25/cfa-v-mcg-habeas-corpus-can-be-an-appropriate-remedy-in-childcare-proceedings-where-thre-has-been-a-fundamental-breach-of-justice/

New Appeal: Must a document required to justify detention be headed as a “Warrant of Detention” in order to be valid ?

Here, P (I) v Governor of Cloverhill Prison, the Supreme Court granted P leave to appeal his order of detention pending deportation. The Court certifying five questions:

(i) Must the document required to justify the detention of an individual be headed as a “Warrant of Detention” in order to be valid ?

(ii) What is the nature of the power to amend a document providing for the detention of an individual relied on in answer to an enquiry under Article 40.4.2° of the Constitution and can a new warrant be provided in place of the original document relied on to justify the detention?

(iii) Can such new document be backdated to the date of the original detention of the individual or should it be regarded as being in addition to the original documentation provided by way of certificate rather than a substitution thereof?

(iv) What effect, if any, does backdating have on the validity of the documentation relied on and the steps taken to detain the applicant?

(v) Finally, what is the jurisdiction of any Court to grant a stay or an injunction to restrain the deportation of an individual pending appeal when the underlying deportation order has never been challenged?

Background

The Governor of Cloverhill Prison was holding P pending deportation on a valid, unchallenged, order for deportation. P issued Article 40.4.2° (habeas corpus) proceedings in the High Court. He alleged that the order for his detention was invalid, as it was headed “Notification of arrest and detention” instead of “Warrant of arrest and detention”. The High Court (Humphreys J) held that the warrant was defective but that the court had an inherent jurisdiction to permit the amendment of the document. The Governor amended the document heading to “Warrant of arrest and detention”, and Humphreys J held that P’s detention was legal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed P’s appeal and upheld the Governor’s cross appeal. It held that the original document was sufficient to justify P’s detention. It also upheld the High Court’s finding on its inherent jurisdiction to amend.

The Supreme Court determined that P had raised issues of general public importance which met the constitutional threshold for a further appeal to the Supreme Court.

 

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by scoirlblog on January 31, 2017  •  Permalink
Posted in asylum, Habeas Corpus, Jurisdiction, New Appeals

Posted by scoirlblog on January 31, 2017

https://scoirl.wordpress.com/2017/01/31/new-appeal-must-a-document-required-to-justify-detention-be-headed-as-a-warrant-of-detention-in-order-to-be-valid/

O’Farrell v Gov of Portlaoise: Supreme Court splits 4/3 for literal over purposive interpretation of s 9 of Transfer of Sentenced Persons Act

Prison2The Supreme Court split four to three in favour of a literal interpretation of s 9 of the Transfer of Sentenced Persons Act 1995 over a purposive interpretation. The Court held that it did not have the power under s 9 of the 1995 Act, or an inherent power of court, to vary the sentence listed on the warrants for the detention of three Real IRA prisoners transferred from England to serve the remainder of their sentence in Ireland.

Background

In 2002, after guilty pleas to conspiracy to commit terrorist offences, an English court sentenced O’Farrell, McDonald and Rafferty to 30 years imprisonment, backdated to the time of their arrest in 2001. In July 2005, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales reduced those sentences to 28 years. In England, all sentences of imprisonment over a minimum threshold consist of two parts, a period of detention and the remaining period to be served in the community under supervision. At the time these sentences were imposed, the division was two thirds in custody and one third under supervision (a 50/50 division currently applies).

In August 2005, all three applied under the Transfer of Sentenced Persons Act 1995 to be transferred to Ireland to serve the remainder of their sentences. The 1995 Act implements the States obligations under the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (link). The Convention is primarily a humanitarian measure to facilitate the social rehabilitation of prisoners in circumstances where they can have contact with their families.

A Department of Justice official wrote to the prisoners informing them that, if transferred, they would serve a longer period of detention, as the maximum period of remission in Ireland is 25%. The approximate release date, if transferred, being January 2022. Each of the prisoners wrote to the Minister accepting that condition as a consequence of their transfer. The Minister instituted proceedings under s 7 of the 1995 Act (link) to have the prisoners transferred to Ireland. In July 2006, the High Court issued the warrants for their transfer. The prisoners were transferred in September 2006. The warrants for their transfer stated the term of imprisonment for each as being 28 years from the date of their sentencing in 2002.

Under the Convention, a state can introduce either a measure to enforce the sentence imposed by the sentencing state or a judicial mechanism to convert the sentence to one under the administrating state’s domestic law. Because of constitutional concerns about sentencing prisoners for convictions in foreign courts, Ireland chose a mechanism of enforcing the sentence imposed by the sentencing state. Under s 7 of the 1995 Act, the High Court can adapt a sentence which is incompatible with Irish law because of duration or legal nature (before a prisoner is transferred). Under s 9 of the 1995 Act, the Minister may apply to the High Court to vary a warrant issued under s 7.

In 2014, the Supreme Court issued its judgment in Sweeney v Governor of Loughlan House [2014] IESC 42 (post) which held that the the period of supervised release in a sentence by a court of England and Wales is not compatible with Irish law. In that case, Sweeney was sentenced to 16 years imprisonment by an English court: eight years in detention followed by eight years under supervised release. Sweeney was transferred to Ireland under s 7 of the 1995 Act. Sweeney had served eight years and challenged his continued detention. The Supreme Court held that, as there was no facility in Ireland for supervised release, under Irish law his sentence was for eight years imprisonment and ordered his release.

Following the Sweeney decision, O’Farrell, McDonald and Rafferty issued Article 40.1 proceedings for their release, on grounds that the warrants for their detention were defective as they stated the periods of imprisonment to be 28 years. In the High Court, Hogan J held that the warrants wee defective (here). In a later judgment he held that the High Court did not have authority under s 9 to vary the warrants to cure the defect; Hogan J ordered the release of the prisoners (here). The State appealed to the Supreme Court. The prisoners cross appealed, claiming that Hogan J should have released them immediately on his finding that the warrants for detention were defective.

Supreme Court

A seven judge panel heard the appeal. All seven agreed that, as a result of the Court’s decision in Sweeney, the warrants were defective. The issue for determination was whether the warrants could be varied to record that, in Irish law, the sentences were for periods of just over 18 years (2/3s of 28) and to commence from the date of their arrest in 2001.

In a jointly written judgment (here) O’Donnell and Clarke (with Denham CJ concurring, here) stated that they would have allowed the State’s appeal. In their opinion, the case was comparable to State (Dillon) v Kelly [1970] IR 174 and State (Brien) v Kelly [1970] IR 69. In Brien, the Supreme Court held that the order for the Brien’s transfer to Portlaoise by ministerial order was defective but refused to order his release as there was a valid order for his detention in St Patrick’s Institute. O’Donnell and Clarke looked at the purpose of the Convention, which they stated to be humanitarian, to provide for the transfer of prisoners to their home country to be close to their families. They held the view that, even though the warrants were defective, there was a valid order from the English courts for the prisoners’ detention. They also stated the view that s 9 permits variation which gives effect to the Convention [8.14]. They would have permitted a variation to the warrant which gave force to the custodial aspect of the English sentence but which allowed the non-custodial aspect to fall away.

The majority dismissed the State’s appeal. Laffoy J (here), with MacMenamin J (here) and OMalley J concurring, held that s 9 conferred jurisdiction on the High Court to vary one or more of the provisions of the warrants, not to vary the nature or duration of the sentence [47]. The sentences imposed by the English court were for 28 years, subject to automatic release after two thirds had been served. She agreed with the High Court that what the Minister was seeking to vary goes to the nature and duration of the sentence. That should have been done by the adaption process prior to transfer [51]. She stated:

On a literal interpretation of s 9, an order “varying” one or more of the provisions of the warrant means an order changing or altering one or more provisions of the warrant. [52] … Adopting the approach adopted by the trial judge in the second judgment in the passage (at para. 23) quoted above, I am also coerced to the conclusion that the variations sought by the Minister, which modify, and indeed fundamentally change, from an overall perspective both the legal nature and duration of the sentence imposed by the sentencing State, in totally eliminating the release on licence in the community component of the sentence, required the making of an adaptation order in 2006 and cannot be dealt with by means of an order to vary the warrant under s 9(1) many years after the transfer has taken place [53].

McKechnie J wrote a judgment (here), concurring with MacMenamin J, Laffoy J and O’Malley J, dismissing the State’s appeal.

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by scoirlblog on July 17, 2016  •  Permalink
Posted in Habeas Corpus, Statutory Interpretation

Posted by scoirlblog on July 17, 2016

https://scoirl.wordpress.com/2016/07/17/ofarrell-v-gov-of-portlaoise-supreme-court-splits-43-for-literal-over-purposive-interpretation-of-s-9-of-transfer-of-sentenced-persons-act/

New appeal: Is the habeas corpus remedy appropriate for child care issues?

shutterstock-2918689-630x420In this determination (Child and Family Agency v S McG) the Supreme Court granted the Child and Family Agency an order enabling an appeal directly from an order of the High Court.

 

The question is:

Where children are made subject to an interim care order under section 17 of the Child Care Act 1991 requiring “that the child named in the order be placed or maintained in the care of” the applicant Child and Family Agency, are such children ever subject to a habeas corpus remedy under Article 40.4.2º of the Constitution as being “unlawfully detained”?

Background

This case began in the District Court, where the Child and Family Agency was seeking an interim care order for two children. The children’s mother (S McG) was provided with legal aid on the morning of the hearing. The solicitor provided only had a few minutes to meet the mother and did not have time to review the social worker reports on which the application was based. The judge refused an application for a one week adjournment and made an order transferring custody of the children to the Agency for 29 days.

Ms McG brought a High Court habeas corpus application under Article 40.4.2º of the Constitution seeking an order that her children were unlawfully detained.

In the High Court, Baker J (here) ordered the release of the children, stating:

50. I am satisfied that the order was not lawfully made and was made without affording an opportunity to the applicants to fully engage with the evidence. Because the question before the District Court related to the day-to-day relationship and care of the children by their mother, and the ongoing contact between the children and their mother, the frailty in the making of the order impacts on its validity in a way that failed to engage the welfare of the children and their place in a family unit.

The Agency made an application to appeal that decision directly to the Supreme Court, bypassing the Court of Appeal. Before granting such an order, Article 34.5.3 of the Constitution (33rd Amendment) requires that the Supreme Court, firstly, be satisfied that the case raises an issue of general public importance (or it’s in the interest of justice): and secondly, the Court must be satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances which warrant an appeal directly from the High Court.

On the facts of the case, the Supreme Court determined, firstly, that this case did raise an issue of general public importance: is it ever appropriate to use the habeas corpus remedy in family proceedings which “concern the paramount interests of children under Article 42A of the Constitution” and where State agencies act in good faith and genuine concern for the welfare of children?

Secondly, the Court found that there is a risk that the case could operate “as a precedent enabling the remedy of habeas corpus in contradistinction to the readily available remedy of an appeal in the ordinary way or an application for judicial review”.

In such circumstances, the Court made an order enabling the appeal.

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by scoirlblog on February 15, 2016  •  Permalink
Posted in Constitution, Family, Habeas Corpus
Tagged

Posted by scoirlblog on February 15, 2016

https://scoirl.wordpress.com/2016/02/15/new-appeal-is-the-habeas-corpus-remedy-appropriate-for-child-care-issues/

Ryan v Governor of Midlands Prison: Habeas corpus not appropriate if there is a prima facie valid order for detention

Prisoner+in+jail+cell+prison1Here, the Court followed precedent that habeas corpus is not an appropriate action to challenge a detention where there is a prima facie valid order for detention. Depending on the circumstances of the case, the applicant should either appeal the validity of the order or seek judicial review of the impugned decision.

Background

In July 2010, the Circuit Criminal Court sentenced Ryan to two concurrent sentences of six years imprisonment for the illegal possession of firearms. His release date under one quarter remission would be November 2014. He applied to the the Minister for Justice for one third remission under rule 59(2) of the Prison Rules 2007. His release date under that rule would be in May 2014.

59(2): The Minister may grant greater remission of sentence in excess of one quarter, but not exceeding one third thereof where a prisoner has shown further good conduct by engaging in structured activity and the Minister is satisfied that, as a result, the prisoner is less likely to re-offend and will be better able to integrate into the community.

The Minister refused Ryan’s application. Under Article 40 of the Constitution, Ryan made a habeas corpus application to the High Court challenging the legality of his continued detention. The Governor produced a valid order for detention. Ryan then argued that the Minister’s decision was procedurally flawed.

Here, Judge Barrett held that Ryan had established his detention was not in accordance with law and ordered his immediate release. The Governor appealed that decision to the Supreme Court on grounds that the Minister’s decision could not be challenged under an Article 40 application.

The Supreme Court followed precedent such as the statement in FX v Clinical Director of the Central Mental Hospital [2014] IESC 1:

65. In general, if there is an order of any court, which does not show an invalidity on its face, then the correct approach is to seek the remedy of an appeal and, if necessary, apply for priority. Or, if it is a court of local jurisdiction, then an application for judicial review may be the appropriate route to take. In such circumstances, where an order of the court does not show any invalidity on its face, the route of the constitutional and immediate remedy of habeas corpus is not an appropriate
approach.

The Court allowed the appeal stating that the order for detention was valid and the Minister’s decision was prima facie valid. Ryan could challenge the Minister’s decision under judicial review proceedings, but not under an Article 40 application.

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by scoirlblog on September 27, 2014  •  Permalink
Posted in Habeas Corpus, Judicial Review
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Posted by scoirlblog on September 27, 2014

https://scoirl.wordpress.com/2014/09/27/ryan-v-governor-of-midlands-prison-habeas-corpus-not-appropriate-if-there-is-a-prima-facie-valid-order-for-detention/